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ABSTRACT
Without exaggeration the basic challenge of management is
economics: how to choose to employ scarce productive
resources to accomplish limited objectives effectively. It is
well recognized today, and increasingly so in post-industrial
societies, that information, broadly defined, is a strategic
economic resource that must be managed if it is to be
productive. A comprehensive literature has developed .in thediscipline of economics which concerns information,
information systems and information-related phenomena of
import to management and the development of management
information systems (MIS). Although this literature is vast,
this overview attempts to relate some of this work to MIS and
MIS research. We highlight results in three general areas:
1) those which concern the effect of information upon economic
markets external to the firm; 2) those which concern issues
of information and its relation to decision making and the
internal organization of the firm; and 3) those which concern
questions of allocation and control of information resources
within the firm. In particular, attention will be directed to
interpretation of the major results related to the effect of
information upon markets and upon individual decision making,
team theory, agency theory, decomposition theory, resourceallocation and pricing, incentives, and information
evaluation.
INTRODUCTION to the firm; 2) those which concern
issues of information and its relation to
Although the now classic MIS research decision making and the internal
article by Mason and Mitroff (58) organization of the firm; and 3) those
highlighted the importance of which concern questions of allocation and
understanding both behavioralist and control of information resources within
rational-economic viewpoints in the the firm. Although the relevant economics
conduct of MIS research, there has been literature encompassed by these three
considerably more emphasis on the former areas is vast, we will attempt to
in current work. However, the MIS highlight some of the salient results
researcher interested in economic issues relevant to MIS researchers andis faced with a vast amount of published practitioners attempting to integrate
research by economists in a bewildering these aspects of economic theory into
number of topical areas. In an attempt to their thinking about MIS. Necessarily,
rectify the problem, this paper examines commentary will be brief and interestedsome of the major themes in economics readers are referred to the articles
which we believe are not only relevant to listed in the bibliography to obtain
scholars interested in MIS research, but better understanding of the mathematicalalso to practitioners interested in models employed by economists in these
understanding economic issues and their areas.
application to MIS. Our presentation will
center on results in three general areas: The paper is organized as follows.
1) those which concern the effect of After providing some background material,
information upon economic markets external attention is directed to the first general
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area, namely the effect of information on non-technical, but abstruse, book is full
exchange economies and production of economic ideas useful for theories of
economies. This is followed under the MIS. In particular, Arrow develops
second general area by consideration of analogies between information channels and
the economics of information applied to managerial decision making by considering
individual decision making within the an information system as a form of channel
firm, which is then extended to the involving irreversible managerial
multi-person case under the topic of investment in its.development and whose
organizational design. Within intended use is in the context of highly
organizational design, consideration is uncertain payoffs. He conjectured that in
given to team theory and a variation of it such a context the private incentive of
known as decomposition theory. The second decision makers to invest in new
general area concludes with a summary of "channels" may be very low relative to the
relevant game theoretic models and their potential organization-wide benefits of
implications for MIS research. Finally, its deployment. If one considers an MIS
the third general area focuses upon to be a kind of "channel" the analogy is
pricing and incentive issues in allocating quite suggestive of further MIS reserach
and controlling formalized MIS services ideas.
within the firm.
A useful non-technical framework for
examining the relationship of information
BACKGROUND to economic decision making is found in
Marschak (55). This surprisingly
In order to fully appreciate recent prophetic article first identified
research in the economics of information societal trends toward the "knowledge
and its application to MIS one must first economy" and devel oped in a
have clear understanding of the framework straightforward way the jargon frequently
embedded in the traditional competitive associated with the information economics
market model at the level of an area. Indeed, much of today's research in
intermediate micro-economics text. economics of information can be traced to
Although many textbooks would qualify as the pioneering work by Marschak in this
background reading in this area, a very and other articles by him (52, 53, 54, and
useful and appealing presentation is given 57).
in the first few chapters of Sharpe (80)· Readers interested in a useful
This text summarizes much of conventional discussion of some of these fundamentalmicro-economic theory and gives an economic issues, applied specifically to a
interesting application of it to the computer related problem, are referred toeconomics of computers. Unfortunately, Emery (25). Finally, a theme of researchmuch of the data on computers utilized in involving empirical study of mamagerialthis text is dated. decision making in economic contexts with
the use of alternative information systems
Another framework important in is summarized in Dickson et. al (20).
understanding the economics of information This collection of studies shows how some
is provided by what has come to be called simple ideas related to economics of
"communications theory", based upon the information can be useful in developing
pioneering work of Shannon (79). Useful MIS research themes in this area.notions related to information encoding
and channel capacity are presented there.
Although communications theory per se has EFFECT OF INFORMATION UPON ECONOMIC
not had significant impact uponm research MARKETSthemes in the economics of information,
Shannon's ideas embodied the first attempt An ongoing theme in current economicsto quantify information content and literature involves models of a
methods of encoding information to achieve competitive economy in which information
a given level of reliability. Much of the is explicitly treated endogenously.
terminology associated with communications Although these models are oftendesign originated with this work. mathematically complex, the underlyingHowever, Shannon-oriented theories ignore motivations are quite straightforward: tothe crucial value-of-information question examine the effect of information uponby tacitly assuming that all.information efficiency and allocation issues within
is equal-valued to the decision maker, an the traditional competitive market
unduly restrictive assumption. While this framework. One example of this is found
might be useful for the engineering design in Ackerloff (1) who examined the 1of reliable and efficient communication misallocations that can occur when sellerschannels, it remained for Arrow (7) to and buyers have differential information
extract meaningful interpretations of it about the "quality" of products. Inin the context of decision-making economic particular, he demonstrates the Paretotheorypand organizations. This inferior movements that are made in a
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competitive economy when buyers have better off in terms of their expected
incomplete information, concerning the wealth after revelation of the public
true state of traded commodities. In this information. In addition, because most of
case a Pareto inferior movement means that these results depend critically on the
at least one person, the buyer, is worse assumption of homogeneity of traders'
off after the trade than before. prior beliefs (prior to the revelation ofinformation), one must very carefully
In the context of "pure exchange" define the assumptions relevant to how
economies in which no production of goods information affects decision making.
occurs, considerable research has been
directed at the impact of the information More important to MIS research, is the
on market equilibria. Development of the ancillary development in these models of
theory can be found in, for example, the distinction between the private and
Hirshleifer (37) and Ng (66). Marshall social value of information. Both
(57) provides a good summary of this Hirshleifer and Marshall emphasize this
research. Although models differ, the distinction. It can be shown in these
underlying theme is that in a models that even though the public
State-preference model of a pure exchange revelation of information is sociallyeconomy the public revelation of valueless, there is nevertheless an
information, even if costlessly obtained, expected gain ex ante to an individual
is at best socially valueless. While this wishing to acquire the same information
may seem surprising, the underlying privately. That is, there is no value to
rationale is reasonably clear: under a publicly releasing the information, but a
linited definition of social welfare, single self-serving individual could
involving consideration of Pareto superior obtain benefit from privately acquiring
movement in the competitive equilibrium, the same information and using this
if information is publicly disclosed about informational advantage to condition his
uncertain future or otherwise unobservable trading prior to everyone else learning
"states of the world" prior to trading, it. The insidiousness of this result is
then at least one trader Will be made clear; if there is private gain to a
strictly worse off than he would be if trader by.acquiring information, then all
trades were effected prior to the traders will invest in information systems
uncertain future state but without the to obtain signals about uncertain but
information. Moveover, those (rare) relevant states of the world. However, if
situations in which public information is everyone obtains this information then it
released yielding a net (windfall) gain to becomes "public" and therefore at best no
all traders occur on17 in the economically improvement occurs and society is theuninteresting case in which no change in loser from excessive investments in MIS.
t r a d i n g o c c u r s over t h e It is important to note that this result
no-public-information case. Since public holds even if there are "insurance"
information is never completely costless markets allowing (risk-adverse) traders to.
to obtain in practice, society is made hedge against the occurrence of
strictly worse off, even in the windfall undesirable states of the world. If such
case, because resources must be devoted to hedging is (costlessly) allowed then the
gathering and disseminating the public release of potentially adverse information
informationt harms no one (in an ex ante sense), since
everyone is "insured' , but society is out
While this result may not at first be the cost of the information gathering
considered relevant to MIS in process itself. Again, these results
organizations, it clearly does highlight appear to hinge critically upon two
several non-obvious issues related to the assumptions: homogeneous beliefs by
impact of information. First, one must be traders about states of the world (all
careful in defining criteria when dealing traders have the same probability
with the impact of information; the distributions over states) and the absence
non-usefulness of public information of productive technology (no production of
result hangs critically on the common goods is conditional on the information).
assumption by economists that
interpersonal comparisons of These latter results have direct
"well-offness" among undominated economic implications for MIS in organizations.
equilibria are not considered. Public First, these models suggest that the
information is "valuable" only if a Pareto development of MIS in the public sector
superior movement in the competitive for the accumulation and disclosure of
equilibrium occurs. That is, if the "public information" is not necessarily
revelation of public information would always desirable, at least under the
make at least one person worse off in his restrictive Pareto dominance criteria.
trading prospects, then the information is Second, these results highlight a notion
considered socially harmful by economists which has much broader implications for
even if many other traders would be made MIS; namely, that there may be in
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practice substantial differences in the INFORMATION, DECISION MAKING AND INTERNAL
private incentives by managers to acquire ORGANIZATION
additional information for decision making
from that which is more broadly or INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING
socially desirable. The implications for
the over investment in MIS are obvious and The impact of information upon
there may be direct parallels between decision making by a single individual is
these results as applied to, for example, now a common topic in management science
a divisionalized organization in which the textbooks. Since most management science
individual managers from their narrow textbooks treat topics, such as Bayesian
pers pective have incentive to invest revision and the expected value of perfect
excessively in MIS in light of what is information, they will not be surveyed
best from overall organizational here. However, useful summaries of this
objectives. and related ideas can be found in Marschak(52), Stigler (89) and Arrow (5)·
On the other hand, more recent Discussions of the behavioral impact of
research in this area has produced information in economic decision making
counterexamples which challenge the social can be found in Simon (81,82), while an
uselessness of information result, even in interesting empirical application of the
the case of pure exchange economies. impact of information upon economic
Models developed by, for example, decision making can be found in Chervany
Verrechia (93) and Ohlson (71) focus upon and Dickson (12).
the homogeneity of beliefs assumption in
these early models. Verrecchia has shown, Less well known in the individual
for example, that in the context of decision making literature and of
"sufficiently heterogeneous" beliefs that immediate relevance to MIS researchers is
the result does not hold. Moreover, it is the work on comparisons of information
commonly agreed that in an economy structures. Seminal contribution to this
involving production, as well as exchange, literature was make by Blackwell (9), but
in which the revelation of information can since it was published in a statistical
affect not only trades but also productive journal, its relevance to economics and
opportunities, that public information MIS went largely unnoticed until recently·
need not be socially valueless· However, Although not explicitly documented, aseven in this context there are likely to such, in the information literature. A
be differential incentives to acquire concise, readable summary of it is given
information from what is socially
optimal. by McGuir
e (60) for the case of discretesignals. Marschak and Miyasawa (50)
present the full theory with some
In a contrasting vein, Wilson (95) extensions, the reading of which requires
developes several simple models to considerable mathematical dexterity·illustrate how the acquisition ofinformation can dramatically affect Essentially, Blackwell views an
outcomes when production of goods can information system (structure) as a device
occur. In a novel approach to formulating which produces "signals" about
models, he demonstrates that under unobservable states of the world to a
uncertainty a producer faced with a decision maker. He then incorporates this
constant returns to scale productive signalling, via the information system,
technology could nevertheless through the into a Savage-rational model of decision
acquisition of information exhibit in the making in the standard way. In this
marketplace economies of scale. That is, context the function of the information
the combined affects of production and signal is to modify the decision maker's
information permit the organization to unconditional prior probability over which
achieve economies of scale even if the of the states will obtain by conditioning
underlying production technology has no on the observed signal. This is then used
such economies. The implications of this to calculate expected payoff overand similar models to our understanding alternative actions, given the observed
the role of MIS are obvious and this is a signal, so as to determine the payoff
fruitful area for further studies. maximizing action given the signal.
Interested readers are also referred to Blackwell assumes that the dexision maker
Hurwicz (38) and Alchian and Demsetz (2) must select one of several alternative
who have developed, somewhat technically, signal generating information systems
additional models illustrating the before observing the specific signal. To
richness with which information can affect do this the payoffs resulting from thethe comparative statics of economic optimal actions, given the possible
models. signals that could be generated from each
of the alternative information systems,
are weighted by the decision maker's prior
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probability of observing the signals in research into organization design from the
order to compare the relative payoff of sociologists by viewing organizations
the alternative information structures. primarily as formalized, impersonal, goalThis allows the decision maker to rank seeking systems which, under
order the information structures according decentralization, can be parti tioned intoto the expected payoffs derived from a collection of goal seeking subsystems
utilizing them. Blackwell then goes on to according to some rules of hierarchy. The
ask the question "Under what conditions thrust in this research has been tocan alternative information structures be examine models of such organizations fromrank ordered without going through the a normative perspective so as to, forprocess of determining payoff maximizing example, examine effects of alternative
decisions for each candidate structure7." hierarchies upon the problem ofIn addressing this he develops the notion coordinating the interacting subsystems.
of "fineness" of an information structure. In this more narrow economics arena,
Loosely speaking, one (costless) organizational design refers to the
information structure is finer than application of economic theory in
another if the first structure yields a multi-person organizations in which themore precise description of which of the effect of markets, if any, is indirect or
states will occur than the second. Not minimal. The operative question is "Whatall information structures can be ranked structures and decision making procedures
by the fineness criterion. Basically, his should be adopted in order to maketheorem establishes that one information rational decisions, in some sense, in the
structure is generally preferred to absence of complete markets?". Background
another if it can be shown to be finer. reading in this area can be found inWhile this is intuitively obvious (the Hirshleifer (34,35,36), Hurwicz (38,39,40)finer structure tells you as much and and Arrow and Hurwicz (6). Advancedpossibly more about which of a set of treatment of the economics of internalstates has occurred), the value of organizations are given by Spence (88),
Blackwell's Theorem is the concrete Stiglitz (90), and reading in McGuire and
operationalization of the concepts Radner (59). More broad base and less
employed. In addition, the real practical mathematical treatment of the
value of Blackwell's Theorem appears to be philosophical issues related to the
those situations when it does not apply. economics of organization design can beThe MIS implications of this case are found in Williamson (94), Grochla and
developed in detail elsewhere, Moore Szyperski (29), Heal (30), Galbraith (27),
(64). and Marschak (56). Most of these authors
attempt to address organizational design
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN from two perspectives: 1) that of
organizational design as regardsOrganizational design refers to the centralization versus decentralizationclass of problems in which the with particular emphasis upon
organizational structure itself is treated specialization and incentives in
as a controllable variable which is decentralized environments and 2) resource
causally related to organizational allocation in decentralized organizations.
performance by some criteria. Although More will be said about resource
there has been no definitive work in allocation in a subsequent topic.addressing the 0211211 design of
organizations even in the economics Decentralization is of interest to MIS
literature, the models which have been because in almost all cases authors have
developed in organizational design have defined decentralization in terms
direct and immediate implication for MIS. critically related to information
Organizational design is a somewhat economics. That is, firms are viewed as
confusing rubric, largely because there is decentralized if discretionary decision
a considerable body of sociological making authority is delegated to
literature which examines the behaviorally subsystems within the organization, there
oriented aspects of the design of is some degree of informational autonomy
organizations. Useful background reading among the subsystems and, finally, that
of this literature is essential if MIS the decision made by one subsystemresearchers are to intelligently apply the influences the goal attainment by other
economics of information models related to subsystems. Organizational design'
organization design. Background reading theories encompass a wide range of
on the behavioral aspects of alternatives from the somewhat
organizational design can be found in uninteresting case of a fully centralized
Cyert and March (15, 16)· An extensive organization, which contains no
summary of recent work in this area can be subsystems, to the fully separable
found in Moore (65). organization in which identifiable
subsystems do not interact. The interestEconomists have differentiated their in these models from an MIS perspective
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stems from the fact that these models much of the work has been unified in a
necessarily identify quite concretely the book by Marschak and Radner (51). An
nature of the information flows, example of an interesting team model would
distributed computation, managerial be one in which agents in a decentralized
incentives and detailed bureaucratic organization each independently observe,
procedures as components of the via an MIS, noisy signals relevant to
organizational design process. That is, their own economic environment, but the
although the motives of economists have environments are correlated such that
been to compare organizational designs or intelligent "sharing" of the observedto address resource allocations, the information could through cooperation
informational "byproducts" of these models improve oprganizational payoff over what
are of considerable interest in developing each of the agents would genetrate acting
theories of normative MIS design which can autonomously. The major question in this
stand the test of rigor. Furthermore, case is "What should be observed and whatmany of these alternativs models have should be communicated (two central
proven to be sufficiently rich in questions of any MIS design) in order to
structure to capture one or more optimally, in some sense, make
observable tenents of actual managerial decisions?". An interesting, if
behavior in organizations, at least as it oversimplified, example of such a team
pertains to formalized decision making theory model can be found in Radner (73).
procedures. For example, versions of In this model Radner examined the relative
these models can not only illustrate but value of s e v e r a l alternative
demonstrate the optimality of the need for organizational designs, such as fully
increased communication as organizations autonomous decision making, complete
with high interaction among subsystems communication among agents, partitioned
decentralize their decision making. More communication, decision by committee and
importantly, the exact nature of the management by exception cases. All
messages among various subsystems and the involved alternative information
signals from the environment, as structures for observation and
components of the MIS, are operationally communication in a simple organizational
defined and their economic value can be setting for a single time period. An
imputed in some cases. Although interesting application of similar
organizational design models have been concepts in team theory to empirical
largely ignored by MIS researchers, there research can be found in MacCrimmon (49).
have been many specific models proposed
which are relevant. For e xpository The mathematical programming approach
convenience alone, a game theoretic to organizational design is closely
paradigm will be offered to examine related to team theory and is based in
organizational design. Team theory and concept on the decomposition of
decomposition theory will be used to mathematical programs as representations
illustrate cooperative game models, while of the fundamental decision making problem
a brief discussion of incentive compatible faced by a decentralized organization.
models and agency theory will be used to The approach taken in this literature is
illustrate applications of non-cooperative to examine alternative ways of breaking
game theory. down the overall problem faced by the
organization into a series of smaller
Team theory was originally developed problems whose composite solutions yield
by Marschak (53,54). Marschak defines an the solution to the overall organizational
organization to be "a group of persons problem. MIS interest in this approach is
whose actions agree with certain rules stimulated by the organizational
that further their common interests" and a implications drawn from the alternative
team as "an organization in which its methods of breaking down or, more
members have only common interests." That precisely, decomposing the overall
is, team theory models 1) eliminate problem. That is, if the overall problem
non-cooperative behavior from multi-person can be decomposed in alternate ways, each
organization models, concentrating instead of which induces a diffe rent
upon the design of communication networks organizational structure, then the problemand the specification of decision rules of organizational design is to evaluate
for the agents in a decentralized the desirability of one versus another of
organization when scarce resources must be these decompositions. Again, from an MIS
allocated to competing uses; 2) assume standpoint these decompositions are of
the goal of the organization is interest primarily because of the
expressible as a single non-separable iterative solution procedure commonly
objective function; and, finally, 3) associated with decomposition models.
assume uncertainty in environmental After each iteration information must be
variables affecting outcomes is present. communicated among subordinate agents and
Example·models incorporating these ideas between subordinate agents and a superior
can be found in Radner (72,73,74) while in order to begin the next iteration. The
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analogy between these models and concepts Zeckhauser (87), Amershi (3), and
of management control and coordination via Mirrelees (61). Incentives and incentive
information and communication systems is compatible control of decentralized
obvious. organizations in this context have been
studied by Groves (30), Loeb (48) and
Background reading in this area can be Demski and Feltham (18). The interesting
found in Batimol and Fabian (8), Burton and case of a collection of principals without
Obel (11), Ruefli (77) and Jennergren necessarily identical tastes who must
(41). MIS readers of this literature must reach a common decision under uncertainty
be careful to see beyond the narrow was studied in a seminal study by Wilson
resources allocative focus of these models (96).
in order to concentrate upon the normative
MIS implications. A specific example of While there are insights useful for
how these models can be utilized to MIS in examining these models, there would
evaluate alternative information systems appear to be numerous areas in which the
is given by Freeland and Moore (26). In models themselves could be applied in
this model it was shown that a highly further understanding MIS related issues.
plausible and intuitively appealing For example, the application of agency
information system in which subordinate theory of incentive compatibility models
agents communicate "bids" for desired to. the contracting for software
resources can be shown not to work in the development or to the design of MIS
sense that the overall organizational systems themselves fits nicely with the
problem would never be solved unless a assumptions commonly employed in these
richer information system were utilized. theories. Extensions of these and similar
By richer it is meant that non bid-related models to the case of the single principal
messages must be allowable for the imposed and multiple agents are currently underway
coordination to be effective. An and could provide a richer context for
empirical application of decomposition modeling information systems in
theory to study the effects of alternative hierarchical organizatons.
information systems can be found in Moore
(62). ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF INFORMATION
Non-cooperative game theory makes the SYSTEMS
same assumptions as in team theory except
that the agents do not share a common Information systems for management, as
goal, thereby inducing non-cooperative well as other environments, require
behavior. Fundamental background reading investments in resources. This fact
is, of course, von Neumann and Morgenstern immediately raises questions regarding how
(97). Although the published literature the use of these resources should be
in non-cooperative games is sizeable, one allocated and controlled within the firm.
segment of it, agency theory, is of Typically, such questions focus on the
immediate relevance to MIS. Agency theory formal information systems in existence or
considers the special case of two, or under consideration and the organizational
possibly more, individuals in which one unit, such as an EDP or MIS department,
individual, the principal, hires another "officially" assigned the primary
individual, who possesses technology or responsibility for providing information
expertise, to act as his agent in the processing industry, the output of an IS
conduct of some decision making task. department is an intermediate means to
Since it is assumed that the agent does some other.'final purpose of the consumer
not necessarily share the same objectives or principal in the firm. For example, an
as the principal, these models cover a IS report provides the basis for a
wide range of practical situations. management decision. Thus, it is
Furthermore, in most cases the principal well-recognized in principle that the
is unable to completely be informed about "true costs" of IS are those incurred
some aspect of the agent's problem, such indirectly through the realized or lostas his utility function or the exact opportunities of the consumers, and as
nature of the resources or expertise such, they are "hidden" from the
offered by the agent. The goal in agency accounting system in place. Nonetheless,
theory is often to establish contracts resource allocation and control in
which induce incentives for the agent to practice usually translates into
act in complete accordance with the monitoring, estimation and recovery of
preference of the principal, despite direct costs. Many of these direct costs
initially conflicting objectives, or to are relatively fixed (e.g., physical
devise penalty or sanction schemes to equipment and labor), although a number of
prevent decision making by the agent which them do vary with IS output and some
would not be in the interests of the outputs are discretionary (e.g., systems
principal. useful references in this area development).
are given by Ross (75,76), Spence and
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In a series of articles (17, 28, 69, Under the normal assumptions on
70) Nolan has surveyed contemporary EDP "well-behaved" demand and cost functions,
administrative practices by a number of the optimal pricing and investment policy
organizations, especially management may be characterized as follows, In each
policies with regard to control. For period where capacity is not binding,
example, despite recognition that IS is a produce the amount demanded and set price
support function and the IS department is equal to marginal variable costs at total
a cost center, in some firms EDP is output. The difference (or present value
organized as a profit center; in other of the difference) between a "market
firms EDP costs are allocated as (pure) clearing price" based on the aggregate
overhead. Nolan hypothesizes that the (inverse) demand function and the marginal
supply (or availability) of EDP services variable cost at a given output level (and
in an organization experiences different in a given period) can be interpreted as
and distinct "stages of growth" (28,70) in the marginal opportunity cost (or value)
response to various characteristics of of capacity at that output level (and time
user demand and the environment. To period). When there is slack, this
manage EDP effectively, he advocates that marginal (opportunity) value is zero· In
control policies as reflected by chargeout each period where capacity is binding, set
systems or resource pricing, should be total output at capacity and set price
flexible and adapt to the conditions of a equal to the marginal variable cost at
given stage· For example, management capacity plus the future worth of the
might subsidize prices during early growth marginal (opportunity) value of capacity
and full-cost or monopoly price services for that period. The investment criterionin excess demand stages to contain is to purchase capacity up to the point
expenditures. Under a chargeout system a where total marginal (opportunity) value
customer is charged for service on a of it is equal to its marginal (purchase)
job-by-job basis according to some formula cost over the planning horizon.
as a function of resources used and unit
prices (e.g., see 42). Some observations are worth nothing on
even this simple case analysis because the
Rather than rely on conventional results in more realistic but complicated
wisdom exclusively, we can productively models are similar, notwithstanding the
consult economic theory for some insight algebraic details. First, there is no
on these issues. First, given the support price discrimination by user - a desirable
status of the IS department one should feature. (Under a profit maximization
seek an objective which maximizes the net criterion there will be price
discounted value of this group's output discrimination in favor of users with
to the firm. That is, if one measures greater demand elasticities.) Second,
this value only as the department's there is differential pricing to reflect
profits (or the producer's surplus), it is peak and off-peak demand periods, wherein
well-known from economics that the firm peak demand consumers pay a premium.
will incur a loss in benefits or welfare Third, if the operating and investment
(what economist's call "consumers: cost functions are linear, then marginal
surplus"). Thus value should be measured costs equal average costs and the cited
as the sum of the producer and consumer decision rules will recover total costs·
surplus. A second consideration at the Note in this instance that the total
outset is whether or not the IS department investment cost is recovered from the
is a monopoly in providing services or if peak-demand period users only. More
organizational customers have access to generally, however, the cost functions
external suppliers. Typically, in most would be non-linear which means that the
large organizations the monopoly situation optimal policy is for the firm to
(or a variant on it) prevails with subsidize IS use. If operating costs are
exceptions being made for unique a pseudo-concave function of output, a
capabiblties, such as access to a dynamic version of the basic model yields
commercial databank. the following behavior: At low outputrelative to capacity marginal costs are
How should services be priced? The significantly below average cost and users
answer to this question depends on how are heavily subsidized. As output (use)
much of the real world complexity one expands, marginal and average costs
wishes to capture in a model of the converge, and the amount of the subsidy
environment (44, 45, 67, 68, 83-86). For reduces. At the point where marginal
example, consider the simplest of worlds costs equal and/or exceed average costs,
in which we have a single productive it is optimal for the firm to expand
resource, a single output, a known, fixed capacity in order to recapture consumer
planning horizon over discrete time surplus -- returning to the high subsidy
periods, and known demands in each period. situation.
We wish to determine prices in each period
and how much resource capacity to procure·
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The basic model has been generalized welfare of a given of potential IS output.
in (44). In that analysis, the This might be viewed as the individual's
assumptions are: heterogeneous resource * reservation price" for the commodity,
capacities by age (or vintage); costs as a 1.e., he would be willing to pay up to or
function of system load, capacity and less than that price and not more. If
resource age; resource replacement; and these reservation prices were public they
an infinite planning horizon. (Rental vs. could be used to set priorities andpurchase decisions are also included allocate output, since in the aggregate
within the framework as a special case; they constitute the "true value" to the
see also 80). Among the results we obtain user population. But for selfish reasons
is the determination of a natural planning individuals have no natural inclination to
subhorizon which is finite and corresponds reveal them and to the contrary, it may be
to the duration of time and individual in their self-interest to lie. Can aresource is actively employed in scheme be designed through which an
production. The analysis also shows that individual maximizes his own welfare by
when it becomes optimal to dispose of a revealing his true "reservation prices7"
particular resource vintage it is optimal Dolan (21-23) has investigated this issue
to replace all of that resource vintage's in the context of congested service
capacity (or equivalently, to "write off„ systems and the cost to users of delays in
all of its economic value). receiving service. He shows that a"Priority price" should be based on
A number of other models have appeared "marginal delay cost which services at any
in the economics literature dealing with time impose on other users." Harris, et
various aspects of pricing for the al. (32) have also studied the'general
allocation and control of information problem in the presence of asymmetric
services in computers - communications information and divergent preferences
networks, (e.g., 19, 24, 78). Space (i.e., between users or divisions and the
limitations preclude a review of this work resource allocating authority or
here. A review of some of this literature headquarters). They show that for a
can be found in Moore (63). In most of particular (linear) model structure,these cases, as above, the analyses certain forms of (rank ordered) transfer
postulate the existence of user demand pricing schedules are optimal
functions and output cost functions (or (cost-minimizing) allocation mechanisms.
equivalently production and expenditures In general, these issues merit further
functions). There is reasonably good research as a basis for enhanced
evidence available in the literature to organization design.
support the contention that IS productionand cost functions can be developed,
(e.g., 14, 45-47, 80). There has also CONCLUSION
been empirical work done at the industry
and the firm level in identifying and Even under the space limitations of
estimating demand functions, (e.g., 10, this brief survey, it should be clear that
13, 14). The evidence is somewhat less there is substantial interaction between
satisfactory at the intraorganizational MIS and economic theory. The relative
level for payments or individuals. Some inattention to economic issues related to
work has been done by Streeter (91, 92) on the impact of information by MIS
IS demand by "computer-dependent workers; " researchers is serious. Although
however, demand by the general consumer behavioral theories related to such things
(the manager or professional) has not been as cognitive information processing,
studied in any depth. One obvious problem implementation of MIS, and management of
here is identifiability, since many (if the MIS design process are important to
not most) general consumers are passive our understanding of this complex topic,
agents in their interactions with IS. in the final analysis the goal of an MIS
Another issue concerns the definition and should be improvement in decision making
measurability of IS outputs in general, effectiveness. We believe that
i.e., in determining what to include or incorporation of economic theory into MIS
exclude. In the area of MIS we do not research should be central to achieving
have a convenient metric as a basis for that goal.
quantifying output and communicating
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INTRODUCTION both the success with which it performs
its functions and the satisfaction itIn this paper we set out to explore derives from doing so. The individuals
the interaction between technology, are said to assume jobs which are in turn
methodology and information systems. Our comprised of tasks. The assignment of
original purpose in doing so was to review individuals to jobs constitutes the
the co-evolution of technology and organizational structure of the
methodology and their interactions. user-system, the assignment of tasks to
However, in exploring the interactions, it jobs constitutes the work structure.
became evident that even within a fixed
time frame of methodological and A task, for our purposes, is initially
technological advancement there are viewed as a black-box transformation
important interactions which need to be which, when triggered, employs external
understood if information systems are to inputs and/or internal knowledge, to
be developed which are both "user- produce an output or response. One can,successful" and technologically sound. of course, decompose tasks into sub-tasks
Thus a second purpose of this paper is to recursively, assuming that the internal
highlight what some of these interactions structure of the task can be determined to
are, how they impact on an information some level.
systems outcome, and the need for further
research in this area. Tasks, at a given level of analysis,
can be classified along a number of
To accomplish these somewhat lofty dimensions; we elect two:
objectives in the short space of this
paper, it is necessary to erect a simple 1. Decomposible v. Non-decomposable
(but expandable) framework by which these (Definable v. Non-definable)
interactions can be explored. The device
chosen is to relate the notion of an 2. Data-oriented v. Non-data-oriented
information system to two systems: a user
system and a (computer-based) By "decomposable" we intend a task
data-processing support system (DP which is capable of being decomposed into
system). An information systems labelled sub-tasks; i.e., it possesses a
methodology is then taken as the means by determinable structure. At some point in
which one alters, over time, the content the decomposition, we reach a point at
of both the user system and the which one can no longer discover sub-tasks
data-processing system so as to introduce (although there may be an underlying "deep
into the organization a "new" information structure"); we call this a non-
system. decomposable task. This invokes asub-criteria: is the task definable or
not? This gives rise to the following
CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS labels assignable to a task at any pointin analysis: decomposable (structurable),
USER-SYSTEM .non-decomposable-definable (programmable),
non-decomposable-non-definable
We take, as the target for IS (indeterminate).
development, a user-system. A user-system
we define to be one or more individuals By "data-oriented" we mean data asco-operating on the accomplishment of one potentially processable by the then
or more functions in an organizaion. The existing data-processing system. This
user-system is said to have criteria by might be data used to trigger the task, to
which it implicitly or explicitly measures supply external input to it, to alter its
32
